The fifth section contains a summary cross-table wall size summary chart that includes all 22 standards and profiles that are cross tabulated by 70 of the crucial characteristics.
The columns provide a thumbnail sketch of each individual standard, while the rows facilitate a quick comparison of individual critical characteristics across all of the 22 standards and profiles. Many readers of our previous book have begun their standards evaluation process with this cross-table. Scientific and technical characteristics can be used for a wide variety of uses with spatial metadata and associated standards. The long period of confrontation and delimitation was superseded by efforts aiming at a more cooperative—yet still antagonistic—coexistence. How this was successfully managed from the late s to the mids is the subject of this JCWS special issue.
The dividing line in Germany was the spot in Europe where the confrontation of the two blocs was most highly visible, as was evident when Soviet leaders triggered the Berlin crises of — and — When the latter crisis subsided, the outcome created possibilities for de-escalation on the basis of the territorial status quo.
This was the essence of President John F. West Germany had to shift from being a Cold War frontline state, continually questioning the postwar order, toward a power with a strong interest in mediating between East and West. This presupposed that the government in Bonn accepted the status quo of the two German states on a territory that was much smaller than that of the former German Reich. However, this did not eliminate the German question once and for all.
The Warsaw Pact member-states highlighted the static elements contained therein: the inviolability of frontiers and the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states. The fight over interpretations divided Eastern and Western Europe despite originating from a text that was adopted by both sides after a protracted process of mutual rapprochement and compromise. The details of what would come of the Final Act were left to the future.
Our opponents intend to fill this page to their advantage, we to ours. The lessening of tensions between East and West provided small and medium-size states of the old continent with more room for maneuver, which they swiftly exploited. Yet this new room for action differed substantially among countries, both across and within the blocs. By the time Ostpolitik began, the FRG had entered a new phase in its still brief history. This move from a strictly opposition role adopted back in to governmental responsibility paved the way for the SPD to win the parliamentary elections of The Western-style parliamentary system, with its alternating governmental parties, had finally become a reality.
Formerly sacrosanct political doctrines were dropped or markedly softened. This was mirrored by a fundamental change in self-perception and self-confidence among West Germans. Citizens of the FRG ceased to perceive their state as provisional and instead developed a specific West German identity. This development points to the third area—foreign policy—in which fundamental changes had occurred by the late s and early s. The short-term goal was the normalization of ties with the countries in Eastern Europe by establishing official diplomatic relations, which until the late s had been maintained only with the Soviet Union.
This initiative was driven by the idea that a systematic multiplication of contacts would eventually lead to new forms of communication between East and West at all political, economic, and cultural levels. In early , Romania alone among East-bloc states had been willing to establish full diplomatic relations with Bonn without any preconditions.
Hungary and Czechoslovakia would have followed suit, but under pressure from Poland and the GDR they delayed acting. The Warsaw Pact then put a price tag on relations with West Germany, indicating that Bonn should pay first.
webmail.wcs2015.org This included the formal recognition of the GDR and the Oder-Neisse Line, an acknowledgment that the Munich agreement of had been invalid from the beginning, and the renunciation of access to nuclear weapons—all of which, the Warsaw Pact countries announced in February , had to be fulfilled before any additional members of the Eastern bloc would join Romania in establishing official relations with Bonn. With the exception of Romania, the Warsaw Pact thus appeared from the outside as a solid and united bloc. In reality, however, the interests of the East European leaders and their aspirations or fears with regard to an East-West rapprochement continued to differ substantially based on the relative emphasis they gave to security policies, economic policies, and national policies.
They demanded from the FRG the recognition of the territorial status quo in order to preserve their own respective spheres of power and influence. Bulgaria and especially Hungary exemplified Warsaw Pact states whose external relations—particularly with the West—were driven by economic considerations. It does not reflect the actual opportunities for pursuing these approaches within the hegemonic framing of the Soviet bloc. However, the typology does allow for a differentiated analysis of the Warsaw Pact. Even though the Soviet bloc seemed on the surface to be a monolithic entity, important cracks had surfaced in earlier years, notably in East Germany and Hungary in and The occupation of Czechoslovakia was especially disappointing to those for whom the Prague Spring had nourished hopes of far-reaching domestic change within a Communist country.
The reformers in Prague did not intend to leave the Warsaw Pact, but they stretched and then transgressed the limits allowed by the Soviet Union for a Communist regime. To this end, the West should offer every desired form of contact and cooperation, while seeking to achieve treaties on the renunciation of force and to support wholesale domestic change within the countries of the Warsaw Pact through the establishment of an international framework of rapprochement.
However, as viewed from Moscow, economic and cultural contacts posed a potentially grave threat if they developed into a gateway for transforming East-bloc societies.
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, das Auswärtige Amt und die deutsche Vereinigung (German Edition) eBook: Gerhard A. Ritter: inunbosodi.gq: Kindle Store. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, das Auswärtige Amt und die deutsche Vereinigung on C. H.; Language: German; ISBN ; ISBN
This was why the Soviet Union—after lengthy and complex internal discussions—decided to crush the Prague Spring with military force. Which compromises from the maximum strategic goals were necessary to achieve meaningful rapprochement in the international politics of the time? Even then, however, the FRG remained a revisionist state intent on changing the status quo in the course of a more comprehensive peaceful change in East-West affairs—at the expense of the GDR and to the detriment of the hegemonic structures in the Soviet sphere of influence.
The main goal of our policy is to overcome the status quo. The articles in this issue focus on how a regulated—though not always tension-free—modus vivendi could be established between West Germany and the states of the Warsaw Pact. The authors analyze two processes of change that—in combination—led to a new pattern of East-West relations: on the one hand the change in politics, with its continuous intensification of bilateral and multilateral contacts; and on the other hand the change in perceptions, contributing to ever more complex images of the other.
More nuanced ways of perceiving the other side began to complement the black-and-white images of Cold War propaganda. Threat perceptions, originating from the early Cold War years, were gradually transcended, generating the sense that one was dealing with states and societies that, despite being in sharp contrast and rivalry with one another, were able to set and follow rules for East-West competition without relying on force. The articles here focus mainly on state action, but on occasion they also shed light on the broad spectrum of non-governmental actors involved in cross-border, cross-bloc communication between East and West, including banks and other companies, party officials, trade unions, journalists, clergy, religious activists, scientists, academics, writers, and artists.
The latest historical research pays great attention to these groups and calls for an enlarged scope of research, highlighting the societal and cultural aspects of the East-West conflict and understanding it as a transnational phenomenon. A comprehensive international history ought to show how politics was intertwined with economics and technology, with culture and science, with public discourse and propaganda, and so forth. The aim is to provide a better understanding of the multitude of perspectives involved in the Soviet bloc in the early s and to contribute to a more refined definition of the stages of East-West rapprochement from through What goals were pursued?
What steps were taken in support of these goals? Were these goals achieved?
For Gorbachev, European security and European integration were not instruments but the ultimate goal of Soviet foreign policy. Our people will not forgive us. Interior Ministers of Germany. From to he was a research assistant of the FDP parliamentary group in Bonn. Vice Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany —
Because of the close connection between power and mission in Communist societies, a new approach to East-West affairs also necessitated a redefinition or at least an adaptation of the relationship between ideology and power politics. This was risky in a system that was legitimized or legitimized itself through a tight set of Marxist-Leninist beliefs. This soon became an almost silent, but nevertheless momentous, process. Soon thereafter, the East German. Among his most recent publications, with Elisabetta Bini and Giuliano Garavini eds.
Department of State , his publications included Foreign Relations of the United States, European Security, The present special issue illustrates nicely a disparity in the field of Cold-War studies. The 25th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent demise of the Communist bloc as well as the continuing opening of archives in many countries have resulted in a new wave of scholarship that aims to explain the transformation and end of the global conflict between East and West that was the Cold War. They offer interesting accounts about ideas, concepts and strategies but leave considerable space for discussion about their actual effects.
In part, the special issue is a follow-up to earlier, more preliminary results published by the authors in an edited volume in Brambach, Rainer Brand, Gerd 5. Brandner, Uwe 5. Brandt, Elmar 9. Brandt, Lars 2. Brandt, Willy 8. Brauers, Jan 1. Braukmann, Gisela 2. Braukmann, Katrin 5. Braukmann, Michael 2.
Braukmann, Reiner 1. Braun, Karlheinz 3. Braun, Karlheinz [vermutlich] 1.
Braun, Markus 1. Braun, Michael Braun, Volker 1. Brauns, Wilhelm 1. Braunschweig, Stanislawa 7. Brazenas, Petras 1. Brecht, Bertolt 8. Brecht, Hans Bredow, Leopold Bill von 1. Breer, Robert 1. Breicha, Otto 2.
Breindl, Brigitte 9. Breisach, Emil 1. Breitbach, Joseph 2. Breither, Karin 2. Breloer, Heinrich 1. Bremer, Claus 5. Bremer, Uwe 2. Bremmer, Gerhard 4. Bremmer, Gerhard [vermutlich] 1. Brenner, Eduard 1. Brentano, Clemens 1.